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None for the Money: How We Actually Make Monetary Decisions
Michael C. Mullarkey
Scott Parker
American University
Abstract
Often, critics of academic scholarship point to the failure of academic findings translating to practical applications.
This paper tackles an issue that most people deal with every single day, how to make smart decisions with their money. The
literature scrutinizing the psychology of monetary decisions is vast. However, in a literature so comprehensive it can be easy to
miss the forest for all the trees. By returning primarily to two authors who did much of the foundational research on the subject
and expanding upon their work, this paper examines the overwhelming prevalence, causes, and future implications of irrational
monetary decision making.
Keywords: decision-making, money, heuristics, positive psychology

A Literature Review
Life is uncertain, and there is a lot of
information available about a stunning number of
variables. However, monetary transactions are often
anything but rational. The lay consensus seems to be
that "other people" make irrational decisions with
money, but few people would admit to any
systematic irrationality, especially their own. How
monetary decisions are made obviously has a huge
effect on everyday life, since monetary transactions
and the decisions surrounding them are absolutely
integral in all forms of society. If people are making
decisions differently than they themselves realize,
how can they expect to make them well? Also, if
economic models do not account for these patterns of
irrational decision-making, how can they purport to
accurately predict consumer behavior on a macro or
micro level? And just how irrational can people be,
and how does that affect purchasing decisions and
general decision-making involving money? What
further research can be done to advance our
understanding of these phenomena?
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman were
influential Israeli psychologists who helped pioneer
the field of behavioral economics. Their historic
collaboration began in 1971 at the Oregon Research
Institute (Poundstone, 2010, p. 87). To further
understand how people make decisions about money,
they simply asked two questions with 2 possible
responses to each. In the first decision, participants
were asked whether they would rather have a 100%
chance of gaining $240 (Option A) or a 25% chance
of gaining $1,000 and a 75% chance of gaining
nothing (Option B). 84% of subjects chose Option A.
The second decision was either a sure loss of $750
(Option C) or a 75% chance of losing $1,000 and a
25% chance of losing nothing (Option D). 87% of
subjects chose Option D (Tversky, 1981, p. 454).
These decisions do not seem ridiculous at face value.

A sure gain puts dollars in one's hand right now, and
if there's any chance one can avoid a loss he or she
might as well try to. Overall, 73% of respondents
chose both Options A and D.
However, when framed in a different way,
those two decisions are exposed as the least rational
decisions one could possibly make given those
options. Subjects were asked to choose one of two
options, both involving two scenarios. The first
option involved first a 25% chance to win $240 and
then a 75% chance to lose $760 (Option 1). The
second option involved first a 25% chance to win
$250 and then a 75% chance to lose $750 (Option 2).
When framed this way, 100% of the subjects chose
the Option 2, and who would not? One has an
equivalent chance of both gaining more money as
well as losing less. Taken together, the Option 1's
scenarios are mathematically equivalent to the most
common responses given during the first series of
questions Options A and D, while the second option's
scenarios are mathematically equivalent to the least
popular series of decisions, Options B and C
(Tversky, 1981, p. 454-455). However, as can now be
observed, the combination of Options B and C is the
most logical, rational combination that one could
choose. Only 3% of the subject pool chose both
options B and C. However, it would be
understandable to believe that this effect might
disappear whenever real money and payouts are
involved because then people will actually care
enough to pay close attention. These same kinds of
questions have been asked with real money on the
line, and the effect remains (Tversky, 1981, p. 454455). So while most everyone believes they are
rational in general and especially when it comes to
money, empirical data says that not only are our
internal calculators broken, they are probably not
even properly turned on.
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Studies in this vein are not flashy to run or
participate in. There are no gorillas running through
the video, no confederates screaming as fake shocks
are administered, and no college students
transforming into ruthless prison guards and
submissive prisoners. However, researchers are
discovering what affects our abilities to be rational
about money and all the important decisions
surrounding monetary transactions. This data can be
used to better understand why markets rise and fall,
how reasonable, intelligent people can be suckered
into loans that make foreclosure all but certain, and
just how bad people are at valuing the possessions
they treasure. Admittedly, the literature on this topic
is so vast that there is no way that it can be
adequately covered in a single paper. As a result,
rather than just bouncing around aimlessly from
study to study, much of the initial literature review
will focus on the work by Tversky and Kahneman.
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economics in
2002 for his work with Tversky, who was denied an
opportunity to share in the prize himself only by his
untimely death several years before.
Following the initial examination of the
literature, this review will primarily focus on
practical applications of this vast academic
knowledge. First, the importance of monetary
transactions will be established. There are probably
very few souls who would argue against the
importance of monetary decisions, but the breadth
and depth of their importance on an everyday basis is
often taken for granted and goes unnoticed by most
of the population. Next, the inherent irrationality in
many of these monetary decisions will be exposed
and examined. People's abilities to be human
calculators doing the arithmetic of utility in their
heads will come under serious fire. Then, the
implications of the irrationality of these decisions
will be discussed. Is being more rational always the
answer? Finally, with better decision making
processes regarding money in place, the definition of
utility will be further challenged. While human
beings according to some economic models want
nothing more than to die with the most toys, while
some real life human beings want to see Europe and
leave their kids to fend for themselves without a trust
fund on which they can rely. Therefore, the
emotional side of utility will be further explored.
People could view money as valuable for a
variety of reasons. For many, money is the
commodity that can be used to acquire basic living
conditions and food. Smaller amounts of money are
worth more to people who have less. For instance,
people become much happier as they earn more
money in a year up until just past a living wage. After
67

that, the amount that people get happier per unit of
money drops considerably (Myers, 2008, p. 41). For
some, money is the means to achieving high status in
society, which can be telegraphed through expensive
material goods and/or experiences. In this case,
people care about their social status as measured by
material wealth because that material wealth can
symbolize non-observable abilities (Rege, 2008, p.
240). A surgeon would not expect his friends to
understand his skills relative to a particularly difficult
surgery, but assumes they will understand he is
skilled if he has a fancy car and a big house.
For others, money is security, providing
them with a safety net if something goes wrong in
their lives. For example, people aged 55-64 are the
people most likely to start a new business while
people aged 20-34 are actually the least likely age
group to do so, despite the conventional wisdom that
younger people take risks more often. While a variety
of factors could be at work, one possibility is that
with money in the bank and financial security
assured, baby boomers can justify leaving jobs with
health insurance, benefits, etc. because they have
security in case of failure and/or emergency. On the
other hand, 20-34 year olds most likely do not have
that nest egg stored away, and cannot justify taking
the same risks (Stangler, 2009, p. 4).
However, money being viewed as
opportunity is one big factor that often gets
overlooked when the value of money is being
discussed. If one has money, then one can anticipate
all the different desirable experiences and things that
the money can buy. This line of reasoning can even
apply to those who do not have money. They view
having money as the potential to move out of a
crime-infested neighborhood, take their spouse out
more often, or send their kids to a better school. In
many cases, anticipation of good things actually
makes people happier than experiencing the good
things themselves (Richins, 1992, p. 230). Money in
the bank, or even just the idea of it, allows people to
hope for and anticipate a wide variety of things, and
as the money increases so can the anticipatory
imagination. These conditions are surely not isolated,
as all of them likely play a role in the valuation of
money for each individual. Essentially, money may
function and be viewed in a range of different ways,
but all of those functions and views are essential to
how the individual operates. The field of positive
psychology would do well to further address the
conception of money as opportunity.
Convincing anyone that monetary
transactions are important is not very difficult.
Convincing that same person of the often-stunning
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irrationality of monetary decisions will prove far
more difficult. Obviously, there is a huge disconnect
between reality as portrayed by research and the
reality perceived by a vast majority of people. The
above average effect could conceivably account for
the difference between perception and reality. In
general, the above-average effect predicts that people
will, on average, rate themselves as above average on
a wide variety of skills. This effect affects people's
perceptions of their ability to make monetary
decisions (Dunning, 1989, p. 1082). However, this
factor alone probably does not account for the lack of
rational decision-making. Imagine a group of athletes
who wake up early one morning to go a tryout for a
prestigious team. For all of these athletes, doing well
in this tryout is essential to their livelihoods and their
future in the sport. If you gave all of these players a
survey before the tryout and asked how good at this
sport they were relative to the others trying out, it is
relatively safe to say that one would see the aboveaverage effect, as this effect has generalized to a wide
variety of skills (Dunning, 1989, p. 1082).
Then, the players are asked by the coaches
to individually give a demonstration of their skills for
a few minutes for the coaches. After all the players
demonstrate the skills, the coaches use a systematic
scoring system to rate their abilities. The next day, all
the players are called back in to the arena by the
coaches. The shocked players are informed none of
them have made the team. Some players had
performed poorly relative to the others, but some
players had done systematically better compared to
the others. There may have even been one or two
special players who showed a spectacular skill set. So
why did no one make the team? All of the players
demonstrated soccer skills during their tryouts, and
the coaches were holding a tryout for a basketball
team.
The above average effect alone cannot
explain the entire disparity between people's
perceived abilities and actual abilities. If people are
not playing the game they think they are, the above
average effect is the least of their worries. Monetary
decisions really are made on an entirely different
playing field than most people realize. If an athlete
thinks that he or she needs soccer skills to be
successful both now and in his or her future, he or
she will spend a lot of her efforts developing soccer
skills. Some of those skills will have generalizability
to sports in general, but many will not. Since many
people believe monetary decisions are primarily
rational, they arm themselves with data, spreadsheets,
and algorithms. Unfortunately, while these skills are
by no means useless, they are not the complete skill
set necessary for monetary decisions.

So what are the necessary tools for dealing
with monetary decisions? Before one can understand
that, one must more closely examine some of the
irrational decision making behaviors that have been
systematically measured and analyzed. By
understanding the variety of problems with the
rational decision making model of behavior, one can
hone in on different skill sets that can be improved
outside of what he or she might expect.
The Tversky example given at the start of
the paper is a good place to begin. The shock value of
only 3% of people making the rational choice under
certain conditions is useful as an attention grabber.
However, understanding the conditions that produce
that level of irrationality is far more intriguing.
Tversky describes several other situations where
people make irrational choices, and his main
explanation for the irrationality is the framing of the
questions. For instance, in the first example, 100% of
people make the rational choice when they only have
to make one decision and choose between two
options. However, only 3% make the correct decision
when the options are framed as 2 separate decisions
with two options each. One possible explanation is
that people fail to consider the cumulative
implications of their decisions when the decisions are
presented separately. Essentially, people appear to be
making the decisions independently without regard
for how the other decision should impact their choice.
This effect is known as minimal account, where only
the direct consequences of an act are considered
before it is made (Tversky, 1981, p. 455-457).
Another phenomenon that can have a
profound effect on decision-making is outcome
framing. Tversky uses the example of a down on his
luck gambler who has lost $140 at the horseracing
track. Now, it's the last race of the day, and the
gambler is considering betting $10 on a horse that has
15:1 odds to win the race. How he or his buddies
frame this bet will likely determine whether he will
actually make it or not. One way to frame the
decision would be as a likely total loss of $150, since
the horse with 15:1 odds is unlikely to win the race.
However, if the gambler does not adjust his reference
point, he will view the gamble as a potential to break
even instead of as a likely loss, thereby rationalizing
a gamble he would not have made on the first race of
the day. Studies show that the most bets placed on
long odds horses occur on the last race of the day, so
it appears that the second type of outcome framing
impacts hard luck gamblers (Tversky, 1981, p. 456).
And anyone who had money in the stock market
during the recent crash and recession had to feel like
a hard-luck gambler, so could this effect have caused
at least some people to take even more risks to win
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back what they had lost? This paper was not able to
find any current data to that effect, but perhaps that
domain should be further explored, along with what
differentiated people willing to take on more
potential loss to try to win it all back from people
who pulled out of the market.
Extensions on minimal account theory have
included work that looks at how much people value
their time. The typical study includes first a
calculator priced at a lower amount, $15, and a jacket
priced at $125. In that scenario, 68% of subjects are
willing to drive twenty minutes to save $5 on the
calculator assuming they're about to buy both items.
However, when the jacket costs $15 and the
calculator costs $125, only 29% were willing to drive
twenty minutes to save $5 on the calculator. By this
virtue, people are only accounting for the price of the
calculator and not the jacket. Since they do not look
beyond immediate consequences, people end up
placing very different money values on their time in
different situations. In a follow up study, which
included nine different pricing scenarios and fill in
the blank prices to eliminate other potential
confounds, subjects ended up valuing twenty minutes
of time from as valuable as $454.81 to as
inconsequential as $1.88 (Azar, 2007, p. 6).
While these framing effects do have
profound effects on decision-making, so far many of
the mechanisms of how they work are less well
understood. Minimal account could be explained via
a biological mechanism. From an evolutionary
perspective, the people that survived were the ones
who were able to make snap decisions that kept them
alive, not people who would crunch long-term
calculations in their heads. On the other hand,
minimal account could be explained as a result of
cognitive heuristics. If someone is paying only
minimal attention to the decision, he or she will make
the decision using peripheral processing. This route
relies on shortcuts, known as heuristics, to make
decisions (Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). Going back to the
original Tversky example, the sure gain of $240 just
seems right, and any subsequent decisions are not
factored into the choice, a decision made as a result
of heuristic based decision-making. Central
processing, where one is focused solely on making
the decision and willing to spend the cognitive
resources to make the decision, would make the
decision by taking both options into account and
actually performing all the calculations necessary to
make the best choice. As previously discussed, this
type of decision-making is paradoxically both
common sense and appears to almost never happen in
real world decision-making.
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Going outside of the normal realms explored
while addressing this issue, the social psychological
concept of cognitive dissonance could provide an
explanation for outcome framing. People want to
view themselves in a positive light and will change
their beliefs to give their actions more of a positive
spin. Consider again the case of the gambler with the
$140 debt and the choice whether to bet $10 on the
horse with 15:1 odds. One reason he might choose to
frame his outcome as a chance to break even is
because he has been gambling all day. He does not
want to view his past actions in a negative light, so he
changes his beliefs. He likely would not believe a
15:1 shot had a great chance to win at the start of the
day, but to resolve his dissonance he will gladly
change his beliefs as long as he can justify his
previous actions (Harmon-Jones, 2008, p. 73).
However, this is not to say that only
particular combinations of choices lead to
irrationality. There is another framing phenomenon
affecting the individual choices. People
systematically have been shown to be risk-averse
when making decisions about potential gains, but
risk-taking when making decisions about potential
losses. Tversky's dramatic example includes
choosing a program that either certainly saves 200
people from a diseased population of 600 or a
program that has a one third chance of saving
everyone in that population and a two-thirds chance
of saving no one. 72% of the subjects chose the
certainty. However, when the question was reframed,
the result was very different. If the options were
framed as either adopting a program where 400
people will die or a program that has a one third
probability of no one dying, 78% of subjects chose
the program that has a one third probability of no one
dying (Tversky, 1981, 453). Again, these options are
mathematically equivalent, but the framing of the
questions drastically affected the outcome. This
decision-making quirk extends to monetary decisionmaking, as these principles are the bedrock of
prospect theory, developed by Tversky and
Kahneman in 1979 (Levy, 1992, p. 180).
There have been a multitude of variations on
this particular study, and some of them have directly
involved monetary decisions. One variation involved
measuring certain emotions being experienced by the
subjects and then having them make monetary
decisions, one positively framed and the other
negatively framed. The study found that the negative
emotions distress and anger do not moderate framing
effects. Essentially, negative emotions are not
associated with people given a positively framed
question becoming more risk averse, nor are they
associated with subjects given a negatively framed
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question become more risk-taking. Also, the positive
emotion enthusiasm does not appear to moderate
framing effects either. However, the emotion of
enthusiasm was associated with greater risk taking
behavior overall (Druckman, 2008, p. 311).
This study should definitely be expanded
upon. First, the inability of negative emotions to
moderate framing effects could speak to the theory
that negative emotions tend to focus one's attention
on a problem and might therefore even exacerbate
certain framing effects (Kok, 2008, p. 3). Also,
positive emotions other than enthusiasm could have
differential effects on framing as well. In the same
study, the experimenters also examined the effects of
emotion on a non-monetary decision, one that
involved saving lives. In that scenario, the emotions
experienced had a significant effect on how much the
subject was affected by the framing. Subjects who
reported being more distressed were shown to be
much more susceptible to framing. However, subjects
who reported enthusiasm were much less affected by
framing. Anger did not appear to either accentuate or
diminish the framing effect (Druckman, 2008, p.
310).
Perhaps the link between the emotions and
the monetary question itself was not strong enough to
measure the effects adequately, since there was no
experimental inducement of any emotion. While the
other question dealt life and death, an emotionally
loaded topic, the monetary question dealt with $1,000
of a community's money. While $1,000 is not a small
sum of money, an entire community losing that
amount is likely not associated with nearly as much
emotion as the possibility of hundreds of people
dying. Future experimenters would have several
options. First, the experimenters could
experimentally induce different positive and negative
emotions, and then observe the effects on adherence
to framing effects while making a monetary decision.
If the experimenters choose to stick with selfreported emotions, they could raise the stakes of the
question by having the subject imagine a substantial
amount of their own money being on the line, such as
a college or retirement fund. Also, as alluded to
earlier, there should be greater differentiation among
emotions, especially positive emotions, where
differentiation is often neglected. For example, could
elevation have a different effect than schadenfreude
on adherence to framing? A differential in the effects
of different positive emotions on other processes
suggests that this is a possibility worth exploring
(Kok, 2008, p. 4).
While these framing effects are all
interesting and flow together well, they were not

Tversky and Kahneman's first or most well
recognized contribution to the field. Not to say that
the framing effect research was not influential, on the
contrary it is one of the defming foundations of
understanding practical decision-making in real
marketplaces. However, the original collaboration
between Tversky and Kahneman, while not dealing
much with monetary decision making directly, broke
down the use of heuristics in decision-making
processes when uncertainties were involved
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). First, an understanding of
this influential paper is necessary for anyone wanting
to understand the psychology of decision-making in
general and can be applied in a multitude of ways to
understand monetary choices.
The paper primarily discusses heuristics,
which were briefly mentioned before as an
explanation for minimal account. The use of
heuristics in decision-making is widespread and the
data should be terrifying to anyone who thinks that
any type of decision is made rationally with any
consistency whatsoever. Three different types of
heuristics play a key role in decision-making:
Representativeness,
Availability,
and
Anchoring/Adjustment. By examining these
heuristics at a basic level, one can acquire a more
general understanding that will allow them to apply
their knowledge of the heuristic to a variety of
monetary decision-making processes (Tversky, 1974,
p. 1124).
The first heuristic the duo explores is
representativeness. Simply put, the representativeness
heuristic causes one to make decisions based on how
similar something, someone, or a situation seems to
other things, people, or situations people have
encountered (Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). On the
surface, this strategy might seem like a good idea.
People learn from their previous experiences, so
being able to tell that something is similar to
something else does not seem like it should
necessarily lead to poor judgments. However, people
will often allow their intuitive judgments that two
things are similar overwhelm substantial evidence
that would result in a different decision being made.
For example, people are often insensitive to base
rates, or how prevalent a certain thing or person is in
a particular sample. People were told that they were
reading a description of one man out of 100 possible
subjects. The description is as follows: "Dick is a 30
year old man. He is married with no children. A man
of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be
quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his
colleagues (Tversky, 1974, p. 1125)." The subjects
were then asked to assign a probability that Dick was
an engineer. In one condition, the subjects were told
70
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there were 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, and in the
other condition the subjects were told there were 70
engineers and 30 lawyers. Subjects assigned a
probability of 50% in both conditions. If the subjects
had been paying attention to base rates, they certainly
would have rated Dick being an engineer as a greater
probability in the 70 engineers condition and a lesser
probability in the 30 engineers condition.
The unlikelihood that someone is attending
to base rates can have a profound effect on his or her
ability to make decisions about money. Essentially,
learning a minimal amount of information about
something where the base rates are not known causes
people to make more irrational decisions than if they
did not have that information. So, someone being
swayed by one particular article or quick advice from
a friend of a friend will likely make poorer choices
about which product to buy or which stock to invest
in than someone who knows generally what kind of
stocks or products are available in that category and
nothing else. Based on this principle, it may be better
to go in blind than gather incomplete information.
Tversky and Kahneman also explain how
the gambler's fallacy contributes to errors in the
context of the representativeness heuristic. The
gambler's fallacy occurs when people convince
themselves that events independently determined by
chance somehow have memory and that a certain
outcome is "due." A classic example is someone
seeing red come up several times in a row on a
roulette wheel, then betting on black for the next spin
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1125). This fallacy occurs because
of a poor understanding of how chance translates to
small number settings. Since a fair coin is has a 50/50
chance of coming up heads in the long run, people
will believe that a heads is inevitable after a run of
tails. However, the law of large numbers applies to
exactly what is says it does, large numbers of trials.
Trying to apply the law of large numbers to a series
of ten coin flips is the equivalent of trying to apply
the theory of relativity to a car going twenty miles
per hour, both misguided and not likely to help one
address the relevant issues. Investors may be
susceptible to this fallacy as well. If the market has
gone unexpected directions several times, it might be
tempting for the investor to intuit that the market
somehow owes him or her one. This temptation can
lead to devastating results, because the movement of
the market is entirely independent of one individual's
decisions.
The gambler's fallacy has also been
observed in real casinos with players betting their
own money. Interestingly, if a person exhibits a
tendency towards the "hot hand" fallacy as well,
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where the player will bet on a particular outcome
because it has occurred several times in a row
(Sundall, 2006, p. 9). While obviously the gambler
cannot commit both of these fallacies at the same
time, the fact that gamblers who are susceptible to
one are often susceptible to the other could be useful
data in several ways. First, there could be an
underlying cause that contributes to fallacies. Locus
of control has been suggested as a possible cause but
the data gathered seems insufficient (Sundall, 2006,
p. 10). However, regardless of whether locus of
control is the underlying cause, understanding that
the two fallacies often do coexist can help researchers
reassess the issue of finding the causal mechanism
for both fallacies. Also, if the gambler's fallacy is
related to the hot hand fallacy, perhaps it and/or other
fallacies are also interrelated. Further research where
experimenters investigated the intercorrelations
between a variety of fallacies would be a difficult
undertaking, but a worthwhile endeavor to see how
these decision making shortcuts are related. Isolating
and examining the effects of individual fallacies in
the lab is a great starting point, but observing how
these fallacies are related during actual decision
making processing will give investigators a wide
potential of new avenues to study.
Another effect that sneaks past people's
attention is their general insensitivity to
predictability. If one reads a description of a
company, how favorable the description is in regards
to the company affects how profitable that person
thinks the company will be, even if the description
has nothing to do with things that would generate
profit (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126). In other words, if
someone were to show a subject a positive
description of a student's extensive volunteer work
with the homeless, that subject would rate that
student's potential for academic success at a higher
rate than if the description of the volunteer work was
only mildly favorable, even though how a person is
as a volunteer likely says very little about how they
are as a student, considering the myriad of contextual
differences between the two situations.
A cousin of this fallacy is the illusion of
validity. This illusion plays on the fact that people
will generally make predictions about someone or
something based on whatever information they have,
even if they know that information is spotty at best or
woefully out of date (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126).
Especially when the information is consistent with
itself, such as a ROTC cadet receiving several
identical scores on aptitude tests, people will be
especially confident with their predictions as opposed
to their confidence when the scores on the aptitude
test are more varied but average to the same score
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However, predictability is statistically more valid if
the input scores are independent and varied as
opposed to redundant inputs, which give a sparse
amount of information by comparison to the more
diverse inputs (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126).
When it comes to monetary decisions
specifically, one example has already been
illustrated. Investors might be enthralled by a
glowing report about one large company's efforts to
go green by adding solar panels to their main office
headquarters. However, this type of information has
very little to do with overall profits of the company,
thus making the data relatively useless to potential
investors. On the other hand, a mediocre report about
the complexities of employing green practices
throughout the inner workings of another company
would likely not cause investors to experience any
kind of excitement, even thought those changes are
much more likely to have an impact on long term
profits and could make the company a smart
investment.
Also, someone can be swayed into believing
that costs will be lower for a project than they
actually will be because they do not attend to cues
that could affect pricing. Unlike the other examples,
the person is not duped primarily by the tone of the
presentation, but rather by not knowing which
predictive effects are important to attend to (Gunner,
1999, 269). So, while he makes every effort to attend
to the proper data, his inherent lack of knowledge
causes him to attend to details that might prove
inconsequential while ignoring data that could be
crucial. The vicious cycle of incompetence assures
that someone who is incompetent does not have the
capacity to realize his or her own incompetence
(Dunning, 2005, p. 15). Without this realization,
many people will continue to believe they are making
decisions about as well as can be expected, even if
their objectively their decision making processes are
completely nonsensical.
Going back to the tryout analogy, it's as if
the coaches do not flat out tell the players they were
rejected because they displayed soccer skills while
they were trying out for a basketball team. Instead,
the coaches give somewhat ambiguous feedback,
leaving the players scratching their heads. This is
often how real feedback from monetary decisionmaking works, as the results of the decisions can be
flat out misleading. Sometimes due to chance,
investing in the company with the solar cells will turn
out to be a great investment, even if the actual reason
for investing in the company was suspect. On the
other hand, maybe the company that is trying to
institute green practices throughout the organization

turns out to be a bad investment because an area of
senior management is found cooking the accounting
books. If people look only at the consequences of the
decision making process instead of the process itself,
they will be giving themselves a lot of false feedback
on what works and what does not.
The last element of the representativeness
heuristic Tversky and Kahneman examine is
misunderstanding of regression to the mean. They do
not directly reference their earlier discussion of
gambler's fallacy, but the two are related. People
committing the gambler's fallacy expect an
instantaneous regression to a statistical mean, despite
the fact most elements of chance have no memory.
However, there is another way to misunderstand
regression towards the mean. The classic example is
flight instructors who gave praise after the best
landings and punishments after the worst.
Subsequently, the instructors noticed that the pilots
who had been punished improved on their next
landing while those who had been praised had a
poorer landing the next time they were graded. These
data points led the instructors to believe that
punishment improved performance while praise
diminished performance (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127).
This conclusion demonstrates a gross
unawareness of regression to the mean. If an average
pilot has an exemplary landing, it follows that a
subsequent landing will likely be less exemplary
since the pilot has performed at the top of the scale
and his average performance lies in the middle of the
same scale. Thus, for every exemplary performance,
there will be a correspondingly poor performance.
This works the same way in reverse when an average
pilot has a horrible landing (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127).
So, the instructors, ignorant of the regression to the
mean, falsely attributed the improvements in
performance to punishment and began using more
punishment in their teaching curriculum while
essentially eliminating the use of praise. However,
the psychological literature suggests these strategies
are both counterproductive to improving
performance, so the flight training school ended up
seeing decreases in performance across the board.
Investors can make this mistake as well. After
watching an investment over-perform for a while, it
is infinitely tempting to dissect every possible reason
it starts performing more normally again. However,
by seeing patterns where there are none, people could
end up making poor decisions not only with that
investment, but in the future as well.
Misunderstanding of regression to the mean has been
shown to negatively impact investment decisionmaking dealing with mutual funds (Moore, 1999, p.
98).
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The second heuristic examined by Tversky
and Kahneman is the availability heuristic. This
heuristic states that people will make decisions based
on situations or ideas that are most easily accessible
in their minds (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127). Memories
and experiences are not neatly filed away waiting to
be taken off a shelf and re-examined. Manipulating
how people recall things can be as simple as showing
them a picture of a certain event or presenting
numbers in an increasing or decreasing order. One
example of a glitch in the availability heuristic is how
easy different types of information are to retrieve. For
example, subjects who heard a list of male and
female celebrities recalled there being more males on
the list when the male celebrities when the male
celebrities were more famous and more females when
the female celebrities were more famous (Tversky,
1974, p. 1127). The assumption here is that things
that can be more easily recalled for one reason or
another will be dubbed as more prevalent. This
assumption is validated again by the house on fire
example previously alluded to. Subjects primed with
a picture of a burning house will report that house
fires occur more often than those who were not
primed with the picture (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127).
A recent monetary example of this element
of the heuristic at work would be when people pull
their money out of the stock market after a huge
crash, such as the crash that occurred in 2008. While
the rational market tip is to buy low and sell high,
people were doing the exact opposite, pulling out of
the market at its lowest point. And you could count a
lot of people out of beginning to invest in the stock
market during the crash (Nocera, 2008). In both of
these cases, the availability heuristic was likely at
work. While rationally, investing for the first time or
sticking with a diversified portfolio might have made
the most sense over time, people were being
assaulted with headlines about the worst economic
downturn since the depression and how the
government needed to bail out large companies so
that the entire economy would not go under. In the
aftermath of all this negative fall out, it would be
very easy for people to recall things going
spectacularly wrong, and hard to remember that the
stock market had very recently been and still would
be a good investment on average over the long term.
An offshoot of this inability to recall is an
insufficient ability to perform a certain type of search
for something in one's memory. For example, the
classic test for this is asking subjects what is more
common, words starting with the letter "r" or words
where "r" is the third letter. A large number of
subjects answer words where "r" is the first letter,
since it is much easier to recall words by their first
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letter than their third letter. This phenomenon likely
stems from the fact that people perform searches for
words by their first letter and almost never perform
searches for words by their third letter (Tversky,
1974, p. 1127). An example of this search error in
monetary decision-making requires more of a subtle
touch. Often people make shortsighted monetary
decisions because they simply do whatever they have
been doing without regard for other potential
alternatives. Since they have often performed their
chosen method for buying products or making
investments, that style is easily recalled and applied.
Also, confirmation bias will cause people to see the
situation as confirming what they already believe, in
this case that their monetary decision is a smart one.
However, there could be better alternatives left
unexplored because of the use of this heuristic
(Nickerson, 1998, p. 175).
Another bias examined is the bias of
imaginability. There are some situations that are just
easier to conceive of than others. For example, it is
easier to construct all the possible two person
committees from ten people than trying to construct
all the possible eight person committees with those
same ten people. With smaller numbers of committee
slots, it is easier for a subject to mentally construct
groups that entirely distinct from each other
containing none of the same members. The more
complex and difficult the situation becomes to
imagine, these types of committees get harder and
harder for someone to form, and so the total number
of groups the person is able to imagine goes down
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1128). The bias might help
explain why people approaching retirement are
reluctant to invest in annuities, which involving
investing a sum of money and then having the
annuity pay out a set amount of that money each
year. This avoidance of annuities is especially
peculiar when one considers they have a high relative
utility. However, especially at retirement age,
imagining the possibility of death could be much
more salient than the possibility of living to an old
age. Taking this into account, many retirees might
choose to invest their money other ways, since they
would not want to lose the enjoyment they might get
from their money by investing it in an annuity that
could tie up some of those funds for a long haul they
might not get to see. Their worry that they will not be
around to enjoy the money overcomes logic and they
choose to invest elsewhere (Hu, 2007, p. 78)
Also, this imaginability bias can take
another form entirely. If someone looks at the after
graduation backpacking trip a student intends to take,
he or she can probably imagine a lot of situations,
like an avalanche, that the recent graduate would not
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be able to deal with easily. However, how easily
these situations are imagined is by no means
correlated with how likely those events are to occur.
In fact, focusing and planning for extremely unlikely
disaster scenarios can take away valuable resources
from considering and examining problems the
backpacker is much more likely to face (Tversky,
1974, p. 1127).
Another bias that takes away attention from
actual concerns is the illusory correlation effect. In a
study that demonstrates this effect, subjects look at a
drawing a mentally ill person had drawn along with
that person's diagnosis. Subsequently, the subjects
vastly overestimated how often things that would be
intuitively related to a diagnosis, such as larger eyes
in the drawings being correlated with suspiciousness.
This illusory correlation continued to effect subjects
even when the correlation between the two was
actually inverted, where drawings with smaller eyes
were directly correlated with suspiciousness (Rabin,
1998, p. 29). This phenomenon could easily extend to
monetary decisions. If someone has a belief about
how a purchase might help her, she will likely see
patterns that confirm this belief. As discussed earlier,
challenging one's own beliefs can be incredibly
difficult, and the illusory correlation plays a big role
in that self-deception. This viewing of nonexistent
patterns is completely unconscious, so no incentive
will help anyone correct this line of thinking.
The last heuristic Tversky and Kahneman
examined was the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic. The other two heuristics have at least made
sense on the surface, even if one did not understand
their pervasiveness or the depth of their impact.
However, this heuristic has dizzying effects that defy
any superficial logical explanation. Essentially, given
a starting point, people cannot adequately adjust for
what the actual value might be, meaning that one can
easily influence the response given by introducing
starting points of different values (Tversky, 1974, p.
1128). To demonstrate this effect, experimenters had
subjects observe a spun wheel that had different
number values from 0 to 100. Subjects were asked to
estimate whether the percentage of African countries
in the United Nations was higher or lower than the
spun number, then give their estimate of the exact
percentage.
The wheel was manipulated so that for half
the subjects it landed on 65 and the other half it
landed on 10. The average estimate of subjects who
initially saw a 65 was 45 percent, while the average
estimate of subjects who initially saw a 10 was 25
percent. Again, these subjects merely saw that
number come up on a spinning wheel that they had

no reason to assume would be anything but random.
However, this arbitrary number resulted in estimates
twenty percentage points apart (Tversky, 1974, p.
1128). Even scarier, these anchoring effects take hold
even when the numbers serving as anchors are
entirely ridiculous. Everyone knows that the average
temperature of San Francisco is nowhere near 558
degrees Fahrenheit, and as amazing as the Beatles
were they did not have anywhere near 100,025 top
ten albums. However, subjects in both cases gave
significantly higher estimates than those who were
primed with a low anchoring number (Poundstone,
2010, p. 13).
Anchoring also explains why people
erroneously tend to choose conjunctive events or
disjunctive events while trying to win a bet.
Logically, the conjunctive events, where the first one
must occur for the second one to even be possible,
are less likely to occur because if the first event fails
the second event cannot even occur, reducing the
possibility of a favorable outcome to zero. In
disjunctive events, only one of the events has to
succeed to have a favorable outcome. When the focus
of a subject narrows to the apparently higher
probabilities of the conjunctive events, they anchor to
it and cannot sufficiently adjust for the fact that the
disjunctive events actually offer better mathematical
odds (Tversky, 1974, p. 1129). Anchoring is hugely
important when one considers pricing and value of
various objects people purchase. What exactly makes
a car worth $20,000? Or a jar of peanut butter $3.49?
People often cannot comprehend something's
absolute value, so they rely entirely on comparison to
other similar goods. A car that seems similar to the
$20,000 car might seem like a steal at $18,000 even
if the car's absolute worth is only $5,000
(Poundstone, 2010, p. 204).
While lay people are often completely
unaware of this fact, people who sell things for a
living know the trick well. The author of this paper
recently visited a country where bargaining is the rule
in monetary transactions. In markets, the sellers
would start out with prices so high that naïve people
assumed that the product was worth about that much,
and only bargain down to a slightly lower price.
However, savvy buyers would name a very low price
first and walk away if the seller named too high a
price in return. Both sides were attempting to use
anchoring to their advantage, and the key factor
seemed to be the willingness to walk away. Often in
monetary transactions, the possibility of not buying a
product or service seems too inconvenient to consider
walking away. Perhaps the willingness to walk away
in bartering situations gives people a low anchor, the
potential that this particular service or good is worth
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zero in that particular context, which helps them
avoid overpaying.
Preference reversals are another beyond
mind-blowing effect examined by Tversky and
Kahneman. In another reversal, Tversky and
Kahneman did not perform the original work on this
theory. The original examination of the stunning
effect was actually done by Ward Edwards, Sarah
Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic. Slovic later
collaborated with Tversky and Kahneman to dissect
the possible causal mechanisms. In the research
scenario, subjects are offered the choice between a
bet where they have a high chance of winning a small
amount of money or losing a tiny amount of money,
designated as the P bet, or a very low chance of
winning a lot of money and a high chance of losing a
moderate amount of money, designated as the $ bet.
In the original study done by Slovic and Lichtenstein,
the subjects first went through a task where they
looked at pairs of bets, one P bet and one $ bet. The
subjects then indicated which of the two bets they
preferred. Then, after an hour of filler tasks, the
subjects were shown first 6 unrelated bets and then
the 13 bets that they had seen before in the previous
preference task. The subjects were then asked for
each bet separately to give an amount of money they
would cause him to not care whether he got to play
the bet or accept the selling price (Lictenstein, 1971,
p. 47). Out of 173 subjects, 123 of them said that they
preferred the P bet during every preference choice,
but without fail said they would demand a higher
selling price for the $ bets. Nearly every subject
reversed preferences at least once. Essentially, the
subjects were saying they preferred one bet, but
placed a higher dollar value on the other one. This
experiment was replicated several times with slight
variations, such as having people bid on the bets
instead of thinking about a selling price (Lichtestein,
1971, p. 47-55). That variation in particular was done
to combat the endowment effect, where people
overvalue something they already have from a
monetary standpoint. During all those replications,
the preference reversal still occurred.
A phenomenon like this seems like it must
be an artifact of a research laboratory. The paper did
receive some criticism, especially that people who
knew that there was no money involved were simply
being lazy and not attending enough to the
information given to them to make correct decisions
(Poundstone, 2010, p. 72). However, an opportunity
arose to show that this phenomenon occurred when
there were much higher stakes in a real world setting.
Edwards had a benefactor who owned a large casino
in Las Vegas. The benefactor allowed the
experimenters to run a ten-week study with no house
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advantage to test if the preference reversal translated
to real life scenarios. The game was extensive and
transferred the principles of the laboratory to a
roulette game with adjustments to ensure the honesty
of participants. The results were the same, the P bets
were preferred and the $ bets were priced higher, and
this was when the participants were playing with
their own money. The greatest loss and adjusted for
inflation were both around $500, but a particularly
intriguing statistic was that the average player lost
money (Poundstone, 2010, p. 74). This occurred
despite the complete lack of a house advantage. The
implications of these preference reversals cannot be
understated. They shatter the idea that people make
choices based on the greatest expected utility of those
decisions. When asked to evaluate choices in terms of
preference, people go with the seemingly rational,
safe decision. However, once they have to describe
their preferences in dollar amount, people completely
lose their bearings. But how is all this related back to
Tversky and Kahneman? The explanation for the
causal mechanism of preference reversals is the
anchoring and adjusting heuristic proposed by the
dynamic duo of Tversky and Kahneman. They
proposed that when subjects had to describe the bets
in terms of money, they anchored to other monetary
amounts, namely the higher prizes. When they tried
to adjust to that anchor they performed insufficient
judgments, consistent with principles of the heuristic,
and therefore the monetary valuations were closer to
the high prize. When looking at the pairs of bets they
preferred and no need to give a monetary answer, the
subjects went with the bet they were more likely to
win because their frame of mind was focused on what
they wanted, not how they would exactly value it
(Tversky, 1990, p. 215). The author chose to focus on
this original preference reversal paper because it is
considered to be the paper that revolutionized the
field. However, the experimenters ended up using
work by Tversky and Kahneman that explained the
causal mechanism of the phenomenon. Lichtenstein,
Slovic, and Edwards may have fired the first shot of
the revolution, but Tversky and Kahneman were the
ones who understood how to load the gun.
As evidenced by the myriad of previous
examples, Tversky and Kahneman's original papers
provided the foundation for much of the future work
done on the monetary decision making process. One
of the main features of all of these heuristics is that
incentives to overcome them did not diminish their
effects. As Kahneman stated in a later paper,
incentives can eliminate careless errors, but they will
not nullify complete cognitive self-deceptions
(Kahneman, 1991, p. 144). Going back to the
confused players trying out for the basketball team,
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being paid just to perform well at the tryout might
have eliminated some careless free kicks, but the
players would have still been playing soccer instead
of basketball. So, even when people are trying to play
close attention and perform their best because there
are real stakes, they still make the same mistakes.
These mistakes are not limited only to everyday
people. Even highly trained researchers make the
same mistakes if the situation is disguised sufficiently
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1130).
So what is the ideal decision making
process? Since a wide variety of studies examined
thus far have looked at the fallacies of heuristics, an
obvious option would be to endorse a completely
rational decision making process. In this process,
people would determine all their options, compute
the probability of that outcome occurring, and assess
the desirability of each of those potential outcomes
(Bohanec, 1988, p. 60). However, there are several
aspects of this system that cast doubt upon its fitness
as a one size fits all decision making model. For
instance, in practical situations it is often impossible
to conceive of all the possible alternatives to a
monetary choice. Will the car someone really want
go on sale in a week after they bought the car that
made the most sense financially? Will having onion
rings make someone happier than the side salad they
purchased instead? Is there another small market
stock someone would have a better chance seeing
long terms gains from? The alternatives to nearly
every choice people make in the real world can seem
endless, and taking time even to try to list all the
plausible would, in a myriad of cases, be
spectacularly inefficient. One could argue, as has
been stated earlier in this paper, that heuristics are
time savers that sacrifice accuracy for speed.
However, there is an emerging literature that suggests
the possibilities that using heuristics, paradoxically,
might be the most rational way to make decisions in
given contexts, even more so than the rational
decision making model (Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 455).
The environmental structure, dictated by uncertainty,
redundancy of the cues, sample size, and the
uniformity of the cues, can determine both if the use
of heuristics are appropriate at all and which
heuristics are appropriate in that given context. Also,
there is some evidence that there is such thing as
information overload, where having only a few
pieces of information can lead to better predictive
abilities of outcomes than having all of the

information (Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 455). However,
there needs to be further expansion upon this research
to topple the paradigm of heuristics as sacrificing
accuracy for the sake of time.
Further examination of the effects of
emotion on the decision-making process is necessary.
Real-life monetary decisions are never made in a
vacuum, they are made by harried schoolteachers,
stressed parents, and sad executives. Further
understanding how emotions play a role in these
decisions will allow people to put themselves in the
best possible situations when making important
decisions.
Overall, monetary decision-making is even
more complicated than it is at face value. Not only
must one take into account a myriad of numbers and
options, one must take into account the actual
decision-making process and all the potential pitfalls
on the road to good decisions. One of the more
discouraging elements of the data gathered on the
heuristics in particular was that even once subjects
were made aware of the heuristics themselves the
heuristically-oriented thinking remained. However,
there are some bright spots. For example, merely
phrasing the question differently can get people to
attend to base rates, and if people are taught base
rates they tend to attend to them in that context
(Mellers, 1998, p. 462). If any wisdom can be derived
from this paper, it is that people make monetary
decisions far differently than they believe they do.
Training oneself to realize when one is using those
heuristics can be time consuming in itself, but likely
worthwhile. If one can at least recognize when
heuristics are being used, when a truly consequential
choice is being made the individual can step back and
make the decision in as well-informed a manner as
possible Also, while heuristics may result in some
errors, one has to decide how much his or her time is
worth. Is the time saved by buying a slightly more
expensive cereal box worth more or less the amount
of money one would save by spending the time
figuring out the least expensive cereal that that
person enjoys? And what about the possibility of
other cereals that he or she does not know about but
could enjoy? Or the further possibility of other
grocery stores that might be offering a better deal?
Psychologists can statistically define how much
people's time might be worth, but only the individual
can decide how much his or her time is truly worth.
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